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While eschewing the abstract and formalist legal rights of bright
line rules, mediation is intended to focus on context and particularity.
This, in Trina's view, disempowers the claims and appeals to
externally created normative standards that have offered hope to
some subordinated people .... Unpredictability of rules, Trina
argued, made power, not rights, the currency of mediative
discourse. '
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This inquiry was inspired by the work of Trina Grillo and the feminist scholars who
have critiqued mediation from the inside, as practitioners as well as scholars. Their
analyses illuminate the contradictions in mediation theory and practice, while affirming
its potential as a liberatory process. The scholarship on mediation points out the
disturbing lack of clarity among mediators about what we are actually doing. This has
been an ongoing problem in establishing mediation as a profession and in setting criteria
for training and evaluating mediators. Confusion among practitioners, often manifest in
either/or categorizations, has meant that parties and attorneys are also unclear about what
to expect from any mediator. This disempowers participants in regard to exercising self-
determination, cited as the most basic element distinguishing mediation from other
processes. While Leonard Riskin points out in his 2003 article that many scholars
continue to use competitive language to frame the problem, he also pays little attention to
the one scholar who offers an inclusive framework to re-solve the dilemma. Leonard L.
Riskin, Decision-Making in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid
System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (2003).
I am extremely grateful to Ellen Waldman not only for providing clarity in the sea of
confusion, but for taking time to review this article in its early form. Thanks also to Mark
Oberman, Robin Miksad, Pat L'Herrou, Terry Rogers, Gopa Dasgupta, Stephanie
Wildman, and Judy Cohen for reading and offering valuable suggestions.
1 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What Trina Taught Me: Reflections on Mediation,
Inequality, Teaching and Life, 81 MiNN. L. REv. 1413, 1419 (1997).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many scholars and practitioners have contributed to the discourse on
defining models, tools, and strategies being used by alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) professionals. A wide range of concepts and perspectives,
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frequently in the form of binary descriptors-a polarized "either this or that"
approach-have been presented. Some descriptions offer a spectrum from
one pole to another or use modifiers such as "lawyer-mediator." 2 Rather than
clarifying the issue, these descriptors, for the most part, have articulated the
confusion. 3
Differences in models are often framed as oppositional, rather than
expansive.4 If mediators are to walk their talk and transcend the win-lose
paradigm, 5 a framework is needed to recognize the value of a wide range of
2 See Anthony Atwell, History of the Association of Attorney Mediators, available at
http://www.attorney-mediators.org/aamhistory.hmtl (last visited Jan. 31, 2005); Cris M.
Currie, Should a Mediator Also Be An Attorney?, available at
http://www.mediate.com/articles/currie.ctm (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
3 See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of
Riskin's Grid, 3 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 88 (1998) (referring to Leonard L. Riskin,
Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the
Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996)) ("Under the Grid, virtually anyone
providing generic ADR services can call themselves a 'mediator.' This lack of clarity and
precision in definition presents a challenge for regulation.").
4 In her review of three books (ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, THE
PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND
RECOGNITION; DEBORAH M. KOLB ET AL., WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS;
and SALLY ENGLE MERRY & NEAL MILNER, POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE
STUDY OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY JUSTICE), Carrie Menkel-Meadow articulates her
disagreement with narrowing rather than expanding the scope of mediation. Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions,
Ideologies, Paradigms and Practices, 11 NEGOT. J. 217, 230 (1995).
Unlike When Talk Works, the other two books fail to display the growing variety of
mediation practice. Instead, in different ways, they cabin the practice of mediation
by arguing on opposite sides of the same question about whether transformative
mediation is possible... they narrow their focus at a time when we should be
expanding our notions of what mediation can do.
Id.
5 Leonard L. Riskin, Decision-Making in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New
New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 18 n.63 (2003) ("I find it ironic that so
many practitioners of mediation who are committed to searching for common ground
(myself included) have characterized much of the treatment of this issue in the literature
as a debate rather than a dialogue or discussion.").
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models.6 Such a framework, taking the discourse beyond either/or, has been
offered by Ellen Waldman. 7
There is ongoing controversy regarding the inclusion of evaluation as a
model of mediation. The pros and cons have been argued in multiple articles
and will be addressed again in this Article, in order to recognize a place for
evaluation among ADR processes.
To define what mediators are doing we will first look at the similarities
among mediators: What basic elements and strategies do we share? To
isolate differences in models, we use a framework for defining mediation
processes based on their parameters, as defined by Waldman. She names
three categories: Norm-Generating, Norm-Educating, and Norm-
Advocating. 8 Within this framework, mediators can choose from a range of
tools and strategies and specify differences in models.9 The multiple issues
and decisions the mediator encounters are addressed by looking at the
parameters of each mediation: What norms are being referenced?
Greater attention needs to be given to identifying and comparing
models.' 0 Waldman's framework would then allow us to compare models
based on a number of categoriesll: theory of conflict, 12 empowerment of
6 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own:
Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1896-97 (1997) ("If the
dispute resolution professionals do not agree among themselves about the appropriate
content of each process, outsiders cannot possibly understand the consequences of
choosing an ADR process.").
7 See Ellen A. Waldman, The Challenge of Certification: How to Ensure Mediator
Competence While Preserving Diversity, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 723, 756 (1996) [hereinafter
Waldman, The Challenge of Certification]; Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of
Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 769
(1997) [hereinafter Waldman, Identifying Social Norms].
8 Waldman, The Challenge of Certification, supra note 7, at 726.
9 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 1887 ("These definitional differences matter
because, while they may begin as behavioral or technique differences in how ADR is
practiced, they derive from different philosophies of ADR and its purposes, implicating
very important ethical concerns.").
10 See Dorothy J. Delia Noce, What is a Model for Mediation Practice? A Critical
Review of Family Mediation: Contemporary Issues, 15 MEDIATION Q. 133, 136 (1997)
("Thoughtful models will advance mediation beyond its current reliance on and
perpetuation of such myths as mediator neutrality and the absence of mediator power and
influence. . . and into what Kolb and associates have termed a 'practice frame.").
11 See Appendix A, Comparison of Mediation Models Chart.
12 See Della Noce, supra note 10, at 137 ("The practice of mediation has been
criticized for 'its almost complete absence of theory about social conflict and
intervention,' which deprives the intervenor of 'intellectual and emotional scaffolding."').
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parties, 13 basis of authority of the mediator, 14 control of the process, 15 and
definition of success. 16 This framework lays a foundation for an exploration
13 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4 ("As long as the parties understand the roles
and different approaches to mediation, an ideology of choice can be satisfied. What is
problematic is when the parties do not understand or agree to what they actually
receive.").
14 See Susan S. Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW &
POL'Y 7, 12 (1986) ("Mediators empower themselves by claiming authority for
themselves, their task, or the program based upon values external to the immediate
situation.").
15 Id. at 14 ("Mediators work towards settlement by controlling interaction and
communication in the mediation session .... Management of the shape of the discussion
is interconnected with manipulating the substance of discussion so that disputants attend
to what can be agreed upon and ignore or give up on issues where there is not
consensus.").
16 There is a longstanding effort to define and measure success in mediation. The
initial underpinnings of mediation came from labor negotiation where settlement was
clearly seen as the goal. See Thomas A. Kochan & Todd Jick, The Public Sector
Mediation Process A Theory and Empirical Examination, 22 J. CONFLICT RES. 211, 211
n.2 (1978).
The primary objective of mediation is to get the parties to reach an agreement.
Therefore, the ultimate criterion of effectiveness or success of mediation is whether
or not the intervention achieves this goal .. . an additional measure of mediation
effectiveness is the proportion of issues that are resolved during the mediation
process.
Id. The authors list four criteria to measure effectiveness:
(1) settlement or no settlement, (2) proportion of issues open at the outset of
mediation that are resolved during mediation, (3) a subjective measure of movement
off the positions held at the outset of the mediation that is designed to measure tacit
as well as actual movement, (4) a subjective measure of holding back on
concessions.
Id. at 212.
By 1988, the defimition was no longer so clear. See Christopher Honeyman, Five
Elements of Mediation, 4 NEGOT. J. 149, 149 n.2 (1988) ("Even within the politically or
legally defined terms of a given program, there is much room for doubt as to what,
exactly, constitutes effective performance. Clear and consistent standards for selecting,
training and evaluating mediators simply do not exist."). In 1990, Honeyman articulated
the difficulty in defining success only as settlement. See Christopher Honeyman, On
Evaluating Mediators, 6 NEGOT. J. 25, 25 n.1 (1990) ("The use of settlement rates to
determine competence begs the question of what kind of settlements the mediator has
helped the parties to reach."). Bush and Folger then challenged the emphasis being placed
on settlement. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 2 (1994)
("Beyond the level described by such conventional definitions, however, the mediation
process contains within it a unique potential for transforming people-engendering moral
779
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of a variety of models and provides a non-adversarial approach to defining
them. Unless such a framework is established for comparing and
differentiating models, there can be no accurate assessment of mediators'
work and no real self-determination of parties. In order for mediators to
consider ourselves a profession, we must be able to say simply and clearly
what we are doing and act accordingly.
II. A TWENTY-FIVE YEAR CONUNDRUM
A. Riskin Articulates the Binary and Modifying Descriptors
In the attempt to define and measure the mediation process, Leonard
Riskin and others, in over two decades of mediation scholarship, have
intentionally or unintentionally defined mediation models in either binary
(either/or) categories or with modifiers that describe the mediator's
background, the strategies used, or the goal. 17 Riskin addresses the
growth."). Going beyond settlement of the presenting dispute, Bush and Folger propose a
much larger goal, to further empowerment and recognition. They offer these definitions:
"[E]mpowerment means the restoration to individuals of a sense of their own value and
strength and their own capacity to handle life's problems. Recognition means the
evocation in individuals of acknowledgment and empathy for the situation and problems
of others." Id. at 2 (emphasis original). In addition to the effort by mediation practitioners
to agree on criteria to measure effectiveness, the courts have played a significant role. See
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 1871 ("On the one hand is the claim that ADR will
ensure speedy, less costly, and therefore more efficient case processing. This strand of the
movement has been called the quantitative, caseload-reducing, or case-management side
of ADR and is the main reason many jurists and court administrators support ADR."). In
her retrospective of the past 25 years, Dorothy J. Della Noce sees the courts as having a
major impact on valuing mediation primarily for its efficiency. See Dorothy J. Della
Noce, Mediation Theory and Policy: The Legacy of the Pound Conference, 17 OHIO ST. J.
ON DisP. RESOL. 545, 546 n.3 (2002) ("Despite the clear recognition of the unique social
value of mediation in various dimensions of human interaction, th[e] argument cast the
potential value of the mediation process to the justice system primarily in terms of
improved case management efficiency."). Thus, we are left to sort out how each model
defines success, allowing for the differences and clarifying the outcomes consumers may
expect, depending upon the model chosen.
17 See Riskin, supra note 3, at 11. Riskin identifies the following binary analyses:
(1) lawyer-mediators vs. non-lawyer mediators (James Alfini & Gerald S. Clay, Should
Lawyer-Mediators be Prohibited from Providing Legal Advice or Evaluations?, DISP.
RESOL. MAG., 1994, at 8); (2) "distributive" and "integrative" bargaining (HOWARD
RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 33-34 (1982)); (3) "competition" and
"collaboration" (Gary T. Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy,
and Behavior, 31 U. KAN. L. REv. 69, 73-92 (1982)); (4) "adversarial" vs. "problem-
solving" (Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
780
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difficulties in discussing conflicts among mediator practices. In his 1996
article, he begins to define the "disagreements [that] arise out of clashing
assumptions-often unarticulated-about the nature and goals of
mediation." 18 Riskin points out that an exceedingly broad range of activities
are being called "mediation," "a process in which an impartial third party,
Structure of Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 755-62 (1984)); (5) "settlement-
oriented" vs. "problem-solving" (Kenneth Kressel et al., The Settlement-Orientation vs.
The Problem-Solving Style in Custody Mediation, 50 J. Soc. ISSUES 67-87 (1994)); (6)
"mini-trial" vs. "matchmaker" (JONATHAN M. HYMAN ET AL., CIVIL SETrLEMENT: STYLES
OF NEGOTIATION IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A REPORT FOR THE NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF THE
COURTS (1995)); (7) "dealmakers" and "orchestrators" (DEBORAH M. KOLB, THE
MEDIATORS 23-45 (1983)); (8) "transformative" vs. "pragmatic, problem-solving"
(Deborah M. Kolb & Kenneth Kressel, The Realities of Making Talk Work, in WHEN
TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 466-79 (Deborah Kolb ed., 1994)); (9)
"communication frame" vs. "settlement frame" (Id.); (10) "task-oriented" vs.
"socioeconomic" (KENNETH KRESSEL & DEAN PRUITT, MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE
PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION 423-24 (1989)); (11)
"broad" vs. "narrow" (Leonard L. Riskin, Two Concepts of Mediation in FMHA's
Farmer Lender Mediation Program, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 21, 60-64 (1993)); (12)
"settlement" vs. "resolution" (J. Michael Keating, Jr. & Margaret L. Shaw, "Compared to
What? ": Defining Terms in Court-Related ADR Program, 6 NEGOT. J. 217 (1990)); (13)
"facilitative" vs. "evaluative" (Riskin, supra note 3, 7-49); and (14) a continuum from
"bargaining" to "therapeutic" (Silbey & Merry, supra note 14, at 19 (arguing against the
evaluative-facilitative construct based on the assertion that the mediators in both
categories manipulate the parties into settlement)).
In addition to the binary categories, several authors have identified multi-faceted
systems: (1) "trashing," "bashing," and "hashing" (James Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and
Hashing It Out: Is This the End of "Good Mediation? ", 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 66-73
(1991)); (2) a 12 step program (JAMES C. FREUND, THE NEUTRAL NEGOTIATOR: WHY AND
How MEDIATORS CAN WORK TO RESOLVE DOLLAR DISPUTES 17, 37-48 (1995)); (3)
"hard," "soft," and "principled" (ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 9-14 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991));
(4) "cooperative," "competitive," and "integrative" (DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL
NEGOTIATION 14-18 (1989)); and (5) the four orientations described by Riskin:
"Litigation Issues," "Business Interests," "Personal/Professional/Relational Issues," and
"Community Interests," for which he acknowledges his source as Lela Love. In addition,
there are several others which prescribe the process or outcome such as: (1) "meditative
mediation" (Shinzen Young, Meditative Mediation (Insight Recordings) (transcript on
file with author)); (2) "justice mediation" practiced by the Mennonites (John P. Lederach
& Ron Kraybill, The Paradox of Popular Justice: A Practitioner's View, in THE
POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 357, 361 (Sally E. Merry & Neal Milner eds., 1993)); and (3)
"peacemaking" (Neal Milner, Linda Colburn: On-The-Spot Mediation in a Public
Housing Project, in WHEN TALK WORKS, supra, at 417).
18 Riskin, supra note 3, at 11.
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who lacks authority to impose a solution, helps others resolve a dispute or
plan a transaction."'1 9
B. Mediators Lack Awareness of "Style"
Riskin cites Kenneth Kressel, Edward A. Frontera, Samuel Florenza,
Frances Butler, and Linda Fish, whose study showed that mediators' "styles"
were in fact consistent in a range of settings. 20 Style did not vary according
to the type of case, nor were mediators conscious of having a particular style.
Most mediators in the study recognized their style only when it was pointed
out to them.2 1 Dorothy Della Noce argues that policymakers mistakenly
address mediation as if it were homogeneous, thereby ignoring significant
differences. 22 Mediators who do address the concept of "style" do so as if it
were "no more consequential than a whim.., as easily donned, shed,
changed, and mixed-and-matched as the day's clothing. '23 Della Noce argues
a model is, by definition, identifiable and reproducible. 24 Carrie Menkel-
Meadow argues that the issue goes to the core of the questions around ethical
boundaries for the profession. 25
19Id. at8.
20 See Kenneth Kressel et al., supra note 17, at 68 ("Mediator style refers to a
cohesive set of strategies that characterize the conduct of a case. It has been observed for
some time that mediators do indeed have stylistic preferences, but the exact nature of
these styles and their consequences are poorly understood.") (citations omitted).
2 1 Id. at72.
[M]ediator style appeared to operate below the level of conscious awareness; style
was something mediators 'did' without full recognizing the underlying coherence or
'logic' behind their style. Mediators were capable of articulating why they adopted
the style they exhibited when their style was pointed out to them, but this took a
conscious effort and the assistance of other team members.
Id.
22 See Dorothy J. Della Noce, Mediation Policy: Theory Matters, VIRGINIA
MEDIATION NETWORK NEWS, July 1999, at 4.
23 Id.
24 See Della Noce, supra note 10, at 135-36. Della Noce uses the concept of models
rather than "styles" to clarify her argument that a model is reproducible.
The term model is used loosely in the mediation field, often interchangeably with
style, approach and orientation. Yet model implies something more substantial than
a practioner's preference or idiosyncratic style. It suggests an example of practice
that is capable and worthy of imitation, a clear and detailed exemplar to which a
practioner can refer for guidance.
Id.
25 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 1921.
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C. Flexibility vs. Seif-Determination of the Parties
Riskin, in direct contrast with the claims that mediators do not change
styles, seems to ultimately agree with those who see the best mediator as one
who is well versed in many styles and flexible in his or her practice. 26 He
thereby concluded that in using his continuum of facilitative-evaluative
mediation, it is difficult to identify the actuality of what many mediators are
doing.27 This is in contrast with his goals to give structure and clarity to the
discourse among mediation professionals and to promote the effort to define
and delineate models being used so that consumers may make informed
choices. 28 Joseph Stulberg, in another perspective on Riskin's Grid, argues
against the market-demand analysis which maintains that parties' desires
should determine the "style" the mediator uses.29
If consumers are to make informed choices, 30 mediators must be able to
convey enough information to insure self-determination of the parties is
maintained. It is unlikely that parties would have the time to learn the fine
points of mediation models as a required preparation for mediation.31 The
[B]ehavioral variations and techniques in mediation are layered with philosophical,
jurisprudential, and ethical differences and consequences .... [T]hese micro
behavioral choices are so deeply connected to larger ethical and justice concerns that
we cannot possibly regulate behavior without having a deeper sense of what our
ethical mandates are.
Id.
26 See Riskin, supra note 3, at 40-41 ("The grid can help us envision an ideal
mediator for any individual case. She would be sufficiently flexible to employ the most
appropriate orientation, strategies, and techniques as the participants' needs present
themselves.").
2 7 Id. at 38.
28 Id. at 38-39.
29 Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations:
Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 985,992-93 (1997).
30 Lela P. Love & Kimberlee K. Kovach, ADR: An Eclectic Array of Processes,
Rather Than One Eclectic Process, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 295, 300 (2000) ("[P]arty self-
determination and informed consent dictate that knowledgeable choices should be made
about which process to select for resolving one's dispute.., this standard should mean
that mediation has a definition so that parties can have legitimate expectations about what
is in store once they elect mediation.").
31 Id. at 297 ("[I]t seems implausible that parties and advocates who are still barely
educated about the differences between primary processes will be able to appreciate the
implication of... confusing terms and academic distinctions.").
783
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process itself can be explained as it unfolds,32 with as much transparency as
possible 33 (the value of and need for transparency throughout mediation has
been little recognized or studied). 34 The frame, the parameters of the
mediation, must be explained and understood by the parties or self-
determination is impossible. 35 Giving information about the processes to be
used is a critical element of self-determination. Mediator credibility and
influence rests on how little disparity there is between what the mediator says
and what actually happens.
How we define flexibility is key. Moving from one mediation model to
another, or one ADR process to another, without parties' consent fails to
adequately fulfill the requirements of informed consent and self-
determination.36 Flexibility in tools and strategies may be desirable, as long
as the boundaries of the frame are clearly acknowledged and agreed upon.
D. Theory Informs Practice
Christopher Moore identifies the mediator's decisions regarding
interventions as based in a theory or hypothesis, but maintains that mediators
32 See Della Noce, supra note 10, at 141 ("[O]nce the contours of a model of
practice have been shaped around a theoretical foundation, it is appropriate to describe
the interventions that the mediator following the model would use and would avoid.").
33 See Michael Moffitt, Casting Light on the Black Box of Mediation: Should
Mediators Make Their Conduct More Transparent?, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 1, 8
(1997).
The gap between what a mediator explains to the parties and what she tries to do
with, to, or for the parties is often wide. This reluctance toward transparency is
reflected both in the existing prescriptive mediation literature and in the current lack
of descriptive research focusing on this question.
Id. (emphasis added).
34 Id. at 7 ("Ironically, the silence that pervades mediation rooms across the country
regarding process divisions is paralleled by a concomitant lack of discourse within
mediation literature.").
35 See Riskin, supra note 5, at 9. In his effort to deal with critiques and commentary
on "Understanding Mediator Orientations," Riskin, in 2003, revised his original work. He
still strongly maintains that "potential users of mediation often had no reliable way to
know or learn what would take place in mediation. The problem was compounded by
three disparities between 'theory' and 'practice,' i.e., between conventional explanations
of mediation and certain common mediator beliefs and behaviors." Id.
36 1d. at 10 ("[M]ost parties and lawyers, and even some mediators, did not
recognize the existence of choices about the goals and characteristics of the mediation
process; nor did they recognize the existence of issues about how, when, and by whom
these choices should be made.").
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use a process of trial and error.37 Moore also proposes a spectrum that
describes mediator practices. He defines the binary as procedure-substance. 38
Andrew Schwebel, David W. Gately, Maureen A. Renner, and Thomas W.
Milburn define models based on the "central assumptions" mediators make
about what will promote change in parties' positions.39 These categories
address the mediator's theories or biases that come from their professional
training prior to mediation. There is general agreement that theory informs
practice; the interventions chosen by a mediator will reflect the mediator's
theory of what resolves conflict. In the "which-came-first-the-chicken-or-the-
egg" debate, scholars opt for theory determining practice. Without awareness
of the theory one is using, it is unlikely that a mediator can recognize that her
or his choice of interventions follows a pattern. Thus, identification of the
model being used is predicated on knowing the theory of conflict being
espoused.40
37 See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES
FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 28-29 (1986).
[I]nterventions are often grounded in a theory that identifies a particular cause for
the conflict and suggests prescriptive actions .... Each intervention is a test of the
theory and a hypothesis ... if these difficulties can be lessened or eliminated, the
parties will have a better chance of reaching settlement. If the desired effect is not
achieved, the intervenor may reject the specific move as ineffective and try another.
If several interventions based on one theory do not work, the intervenor may shift to
another theory and begin trial-and-error testing again.
Id.
38 Id. at 41-42.
There is a spectrum along which mediators place themselves in defining their degree
of involvement in the procedure and substance of negotiations. On one side are those
who advocate mostly procedural interventions; on the other side are advocates of
substantive involvement by the mediator that may include actually forging the
decision. Between them are mediators who pursue a role with mixed involvement in
process and substance.
Id.
39 Andrew Schwebel et al., Divorce Mediation: Four Models and Their Assumptions
About Change in Parties' Positions, 11 MEDIATION Q. 211, 213 (1994) (describing four
models of divorce mediation: (1) legal, (2) labor management, (3) therapeutic, and (4)
communication and information).
[O]ne key variable stood out in the published descriptions of divorce mediation
approaches. This key variable is the "central assumptions" that the approach makes
about what promotes change in parties' positions. Mediators utilize this central
assumption to develop change promoting strategies and conditions during sessions,
and these, in turn, help parties modify their positions and reach agreement.
Id.
40 Della Noce, supra note 10, at 140.
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E. Waldman's Categories
Use of Waldman's categories means establishing whether the primary
framework is the parties' own norms (Norm-Generating models), or the
parties' norms and all other relevant information (Norm-Educating models),
or legal and institutional regulations that preclude any agreement outside the
pre-existing boundaries (Norm-Advocating models). Without this
information, self-determination is suspect and the potential for coercion41
and manipulation increases dramatically. 42 In naming categories of mediation
models as Norm-Generating, Norm-Educating, and Norm-Advocating,
Waldman grounds mediation theory in the parameters of the mediation
itself.43 In naming three categories that address the situation and context of
the mediation,44 she goes beyond a binary framework. This construct
provides the profession with a way to make sense of the issues45 and, at the
same time, reinforces self-determination of the parties. 46
Far too many of the mediation books on the market today offer pages. and pages of
how-to advice devoid of any theoretical or empirical framework. From such books, a
practitioner can acquire a set of tricks and manipulations, but no rationale for the
purpose and consequences of the various interventions in any given situation.
Id.
41 See Donald T. Weckstein, In Praise of Party Empowerment-and of Mediator
Activism, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 501, 502 (1997) ("A coerced settlement is inconsistent
with a legitimate mediation process, as is any resolution that lacks voluntary and
informed consent of the disputants. A party who is unaware of important information or
available alternatives to an offered settlement is prevented from exercising effective self-
determination.").
42 See Silbey & Merry, supra note 14, at 27.
The mediator wraps him or herself in the same mystical cloth as the jurist, the rabbi
or the priest; and while not proclaiming openly that he is the embodiment of the law
or of God, he nevertheless proclaims access to knowledge and wisdom derived from
a special school of trained neutrality.
Id.
43 See Waldman, Identifying Social Norms, supra note 7, at 769 ("[I]f mediators,
like most professionals, are expected to obtain informed consent to their interventions,
they can do so only by providing thoughtful and accurate information about the process.
Further discussion and reflection is needed to close the gap between mediation theory and
reality.").
44 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 236 ("[M]ediation is deeply contextual and,
when situated in different environments and institutions, it will perform different social
tasks.").
45 Waldman, Identifying Social Norms, supra note 7, at 708-09.
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Norm-Generating Mediation applies to any mediation in which the
parties reference primarily their own values and standards. While all
mediation operates "in the shadow of the law," Norm-Generating models
focus the attention on the interpersonal issues.
Norm-Educating Mediation is based on the theory that people who are
well-informed make better decisions. While guided by their own values,
participants will also gather all relevant information throughout the
mediation process. In addition, they are encouraged to learn skills of
negotiation for use outside the mediation.
Norm-Advocating Mediation is any mediation in which legal statutes
or institutional regulations dictate the parameters of the mediation agreement.
Parties must be informed of these restrictions prior to and throughout the
mediation.
Waldman's categories provide a way for the mediation profession to
explain accurately and efficiently what participants can expect in any given
mediation. Both process and substance decisions should be based on the
parties' (and attorneys') and mediators' influence regarding the norms being
referenced. 47 This furthers self-determination of the parties by giving the
[D]rawing a conceptual distinction between these related but separate processes is
necessary if mediation theory is to keep pace with actual practice. Although existing
classifications fruitfully illuminate certain issues, answers to other increasingly
pressing questions remain obscure. As the mediation field moves to assume the
insignias of an established profession, it faces a number of challenges. How is
mediator education and training to be organized and evaluated? Is licensure or
certification necessary to protect the consumer? If so, how are such programs to be
established? What core set of ethical principles guide mediator behavior?
Id.
46 Id. at 707 ("Heightened attention to the role of social norms in mediation is
necessary to allow mediators to adequately explain their methodologies and to allow
clients to supply informed consent to mediator interventions.").
47 Riskin, supra note 5, at 34.
The [grid] system makes central the idea of participant 'influence' with respect to
particular issues. It provides a method for considering the influence that participants
aspire to exert, actually exert, and expect others to exert, with respect to any of a
wide range of decisions. It does this by dividing mediation decisionmaking into
three categories: substantive, procedural and meta-procedural.
Id.
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process transparency 48 and defining process differences. 49 If switching from
one to another is desirable, the parties understand and consent at the point at
which that decision is made. 50
F. Mediation Is Evaluative and Facilitative
Getting beyond a binary framework allows us to entertain the notion that
mediation is always evaluative5' in the sense that a mediator must evaluate
the following throughout the process: (1) the capacity, authority, and
intention of the parties to negotiate; (2) tools and interventions to use based
on assessment of the situation; and (3) their own neutrality and impartiality
regarding the outcome and their ability to balance power. 52 Mediation is
always facilitative in its goal to assist parties in crafting agreements that
work for them, in addition to its potential to engender understanding,
empowerment, and mutual recognition.53
48 See Moffitt, supra note 33, at 8 ("[T]ransparency should be treated as a question
which transcends mediation models.").
49 See Riskin, supra note 5.
50 Id. at 49 ("[T]he grid system points out that, implicitly or explicitly, procedural
and meta-procedural decisions get made, and that it is possible to make such processes
open and to allow all participants to exercise influence in them.") (emphasis added).
51 L. Randolph Lowry, To Evaluate or Not That Is Not the Question, 38 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 48,49 (2000).
[A]t least on one level, all mediators are involved in evaluation-that sense of
making judgments on the information presented. Evaluation, at least internally with
the mediator, is central to the mediator's work. It is the basis on which decisions are
made regarding the management of the process and the parties as well as the
resolution of the problem.
Id.
52 See Waldman, Identifying Social Norms, supra note 7, at 766-67.
The codes, then, call upon mediators to assume blatantly contradictory stances. On
the one hand, they are to promote disputant autonomy by enabling the disputants to
decide for themselves how they wish to resolve their disputes .... On the other
hand, the mediator is expected to challenge disputants when they are inclining
towards agreements that the mediator deems unfair, inequitable, unlikely to hold,
disadvantageous to the parties, disadvantageous to third parties, or simply
uninformed.
Id.
53 See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16, at 259 (recognizing the transformative power
of mediation and its impact on the society in general).
[P]eople in the mediation movement are deciding whether mediation will remain
one more institution in an individualist society or become a foundational part of a
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III. EVALUATION AS A DISTINCT PROCESS
A. Self-Determination Defines Mediation
Riskin argues that excluding evaluation as not mediation is like closing
the barn door after the horse has escaped. "Usage determines meaning. 54
However, if we accept self-determination as the most basic element of
mediation,55 then evaluation of a probable outcome in court by a third party
does not fit within this definition of mediation. 56 Differing with Riskin,
Kimberlee K. Kovach and Lela P. Love argue that the Standards of Conduct
for Mediators defines mediation as "a process in which an impartial third
party-a mediator-facilitates the resolution of a dispute by promoting
voluntary agreement (or 'self-determination') .... ,,57
B. Clarification of "Evaluation" and "Evaluative"
Clarification of the meaning of the words evaluation and evaluative
among professionals, and with consumers, 58 would lessen the confusion.
different, relational society that is not a utopian dream but a gradually emerging
reality .... Not just the mediation movement but the entire society stands at a
crossroads, choosing which path to take.
Id.
54 Riskin, supra note 3, at 13.
55 Kovach & Love, supra note 3, at 84. The authors reference three organizations of
dispute resolution professionals who developed a set of Joint Standards between 1992
and 1994. The American Bar Association Sections of Dispute Resolution and Litigation,
the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, and the American Arbitration
Association agreed that "mediation rests upon the principle of self-determination by the
parties .... [T]he Joint Standards state that mediators should not advise the parties." Id.
56 Id. at 105 (arguing that there are dangers in the use of evaluation in mediation).
Mediators use caucuses as a primary strategy. Judges or arbitrators typically cannot
use caucuses because of constraints on ex parte communications. Where the neutral
must evaluate, receiving evidence or other information out of the presence of one of
the parties denies the absent party the right to hear and confront testimony that might
be used against him .... [E]valuations and opinions arising from a mediation may
have serious flaws. Neutrals should wam parties and obtain their informed consent
before "mixing" processes.
Id.
57 Id. at 76.
58 Id. at 108-09.
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Evaluation has been hotly debated as either a model of mediation or a
separate process. 59 I agree with those who want evaluation considered a
distinct ADR process in which a professional assesses for the parties the
potential outcome in court. Explaining the specific structure of the evaluation
process allows the consumer to make an informed choice.
Lela P. Love argues against both evaluation and an evaluative mediation
model based on the harmful potential to compromise the neutrality of the
mediator.60 Love and Riskin both recognize the value of evaluation,61 though
Love holds that mixing processes is detrimental. Love acknowledges,
however, that mediators do evaluate on process decisions.62 Riskin believes
Without a common understanding of mediation, we will experience trouble
developing codes of ethics, finding qualified neutrals, or designing appropriate
training programs.
Giving the same label 'mediation' to activities which involve different levels of
intervention into conflict-evaluation and facilitation-misleads and cripples with
confusion the genius of an otherwise dynamic and powerful process.
Id.
59 See generally, James J. Alfini, Moderator, Evaluative Versus Facilitative
Mediation: A Discussion, 24 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 919 (1997); Richard Birke, Evaluation
and Facilitation: Moving Past Either/Or, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 309 (2000); Della Noce,
supra note 22, at 4-5; Kovach & Love, supra note 3; John Lande, Toward More
Sophisticated Mediation Theory, 2000 J. DIsP. RESOL. 321 (2000); Love & Kovach, supra
note 30; Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 937 (1997); Lowry, supra note 51; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6;
Riskin, supra note 5; Riskin, supra note 3; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Identifying Real
Dichotomies Underlying the False Dichotomy: Twenty-First Century Mediation in an
Eclectic Regime, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 371 (2000); Stulberg, supra note 29; Ellen A.
Waldman, The Evaluative-Facilitative Debate in Mediation: Applying the Lens of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 82 MARQ. L. REv. 155 (1998); Nancy A. Welsh, The
Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable
Price of Institutionalization, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1 (1996).
60 Love, supra note 59, at 939.
[T]he evaluative tasks of determining facts, applying law or custom, and delivering
an opinion not only divert the mediator away from facilitation, but also can
compromise the mediator's neutrality-both in actuality and in the eyes of the
parties-because the mediator will be favoring one side in his or her judgment.
Id.
61 Id. at 946 n. 1 ("While a neutral evaluation can be critical in generating a
settlement by expanding parties' information bases and deflating unrealistic positions, the
potential harms of a mediator evaluating outweigh the potential benefits.").
62 Love & Kovach, supra note 30, at 303 ("[T]he mediator's role is highly
demanding and involves multiple evaluations about helpful sitting and seating
790
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that mediators may alternate between evaluation and facilitation in such a
way that the evaluation leads to facilitation.63 In his effort to address what is
actually being done by mediators as opposed to the theories they espouse,
Riskin continues to claim that
many, probably most, mediators engage in behaviors that fit into both
categories. They evaluate and facilitate.. .mediators often evaluate on some
issues and facilitate on others, all within the same time block, and they
typically decide on their moves at least partially in response to the
personalities and conduct of the other participants. 64
If we have any hope of finding clarity, however, it does not come from
the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators in which the vague wording
allows for a multitude of interpretations. For example, the preface describes a
mediator as one who "facilitates communications, promotes understanding,
focuses the parties on their interests, and seeks creative problem solving to
enable the parties to reach their own agreement. These standards give
meaning to this definition of mediation. ' '65
Mediators are in all cases assessing the parties' capacity and good faith
intentions throughout the process. The mediator is also expected to continue
to assess her or his own ability to remain neutral and impartial. Mediators
assess the nature of the conflict in order to determine what tools and
strategies to use throughout the process. Parties would ideally make a choice
of mediator based on the model or process offered. 66 Use of a range of
interventions provides options and flexibility for mediators to offer parties. 67
Evaluation of the probable outcome in court, however, while being seen by
arrangements, participant mixes, agenda constructions, session configurations, food
breaks, deadlines, reality testing and drafting choices (to name a few).").
63 Riskin, supra note 5, at 15 ("A prediction about what would happen in court, for
example-given in the right manner, at the right time, in the right context-can help
enable (or empower) the parties to negotiate in light of that information and not merely in
its shadow.") (emphasis added).
6 4 Id. at 14.
65 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Preface (1994), available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/modelstandardardsofconduct.doc (last visited Jan. 27,
2005).
66 Riskin, supra note 5, at 51 ("[T]he mediator orientation grids ... can guide
participants in choosing a mediator and preparing for a mediation.").
67 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 1902 ("Different litigants may desire different
processes and/or remedies, and offering an adaptive menu of process choices could
respond to these different requirements.").
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many as permissible, 68 already exists in good standing as a separate
process. 69
Evaluating or assessing the parties, the circumstances, and the mediator's
ability to maintain neutrality is an integral part of all mediation. Evaluation
of the outcome in court is a specific process that may indeed be helpful, even
in directing parties back into mediation. Keeping this as a separate ADR
process provides clarity for both the parties and the mediator. Mediators
offering both processes need to, at the very least, make clear which one is
being used at any given time.
IV. NAMING ADR PROCESSES
Separating evaluation from mediation on the list of ADR structures 70
offers practitioners clarity about the existing set of ADR options. The
structures chosen determine the strategies and tools that are appropriate.
Processes listed are in (approximate) order from most party control to least
party control:
1. Mediation
a. Norm-Generating
b. Norm-Educating
c. Norm-Advocating
2. Evaluation
3. Arbitration
68 Welsh, supra note 59, at 4 (2001).
[A]s mediation has been institutionalized in the courts and as evaluation has become
an acknowledged and accepted part of the mediator's function, the original vision of
self-determination is giving way to a vision in which the disputing parties play a less
central role. The parties are still responsible for making the final decisions regarding
settlement, but they are cast in the role of consumers, largely limited to selecting
from among the settlement options developed by their attorneys.
Id.
69 See Kovach & Love, supra note 3, at 77 ("[T]he practice of neutral evaluation has
a confirmed role outside the practice of mediation. Statutes and court rules support a
variety of evaluative procedures ... ").
70 Glossary of ADR Processes, available at
http://www.law.missouri.edu/csdr/adrglossary.htm (last modified May 14, 2004). This
web site lists the main ADR processes alphabetically and gives a full explanation of each
process. Here, I list the range of processes approximating the most party control to least
party control: (1) mediation, (2) (early) neutral evaluation, (3) med-arb, (4) arbitration,
(5) neutral fact-finding, (6) mini-trial, (7) moderated settlement conference, (8) private
judging/consensual special magistrate, and (9) summary jury trial.
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If ADR professionals are to identify clearly the structure being used, we
must convey the necessary information about the boundaries of the process in
order to promote informed consent,71 a defining element of self-
determination of the parties. If mediation is the process being used,
consumers need to understand the social and legal boundaries surrounding
the model, as well as the basic elements that define what is required of the
mediators72 and parties,73 thus supporting fairness and informed consent.74
The three categories named by Waldman are therefore necessary in the
orientation process to explain the model or models proposed by the mediator.
All three are called upon during orientation. The mediator must educate the
parties about the mediation model and the basic elements (Norm-Educating).
The mediator elicits the story and determines the appropriateness for
mediation (Norm-Generating). The mediator assesses each party's capacity
and willingness to negotiate, self-evaluates regarding ethical standards of
neutrality and impartiality, and informs parties of any legal or regulatory
standards that might impinge upon their agreement, or that might endanger
other parties if not made public (Norm-Advocating).
Use of this framework eliminates the muddle that is the result of labels
and categories that do not match what is actually happening. 75 In the
71 See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding
Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 775, 781 (1999)
("Informed consent is the foundational moral and ethical principle that promotes respect
for individual self-determination and honors human dignity. The principle of informed
consent is the vehicle through which autonomy is measured in decisionmaking between
physicians and patients, and, to a lesser degree, between lawyers and clients.");
Weckstein, supra note 41, at 503 ("The key to self-determination is informed consent. A
disputant who is unaware of relevant facts or law that, if known, would influence that
party's decision cannot engage in meaningful self-determination.").
72 Love & Kovach, supra note 30, at 298-99 ("Knowing precisely the service that
will be rendered, and the required skill set to deliver that service, is necessary to target
the qualifications and training that will underpin credentialing.").
73 Id. at 297 ("Advocates and parties would be forewarned to consider judiciously
what information to present to a neutral who will ultimately give an opinion which may
well have a decisive impact on further negotiations.").
74 Nolan-Haley, supra note 71, at 777.
Mediation shares a common goal of the court system: to achieve justice and fairness
in the resolution of disputes. Mediation, however, is different from litigation because
it is governed by the principle of consent. Parties must agree to engage in the
process and to its outcome. In this respect, the values of mediation are quite different
from litigation.
Id.
75 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 232.
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orientation and during the explanation of the agreement to mediate, the
mediator establishes a frame into which the parties voluntarily enter. While
parties have agency in the process at many points along the way,76 the
mediator sets the stage77 and offers a space in which an even playing field is
said to be maintained. As the mediator listens for the key issues during the
orientation, 78 he or she brings out the story from each party helping each to
identify her or his self-interests and values (norms). In explaining
confidentiality, the mediator gives legal information and explains how the
decisions regarding confidentiality will impact their agreement and any
future court processes.
Although Waldman identifies three distinct categories, she acknowledges
that these inevitably overlap. 79 While all three are used during orientation,
I object to the continuing polarized and dichotomous ways. of conceiving of
mediation as either rights or interests based or individualized or collectivized or
political or psychological. Good mediation.. . deals with these levels
simultaneously .... Other models of dispute resolution, presumed to be more
"rights" focused, are themselves more likely to look like a hybrid of
"bureaucratized" discretionary justice, rather than rights based adjudication.., we
must stop the kinds of simplistic taxonomies that academic critics... love to create
that simply do not ring true for many practitioners.
Id.
76 See Moffit, supra note 33, at 20 ("[M]any parties experience mediators as
authority figures and expect them to play quasi-judicial roles. As hard as mediators may
try to dispel these impressions, such preconceptions often impact parties' perceptions.").
77 1d. at6.
Many mediators and scholars treat mediation within any model as if it were a black
box or a kind of magic show in which the mediator "does her thing" for or to the
participants without explaining what "her thing" is or how or why it is expected to
work. Indeed, some mediators treat their role like that of a magician's, avoiding
explanations as if they were secrets that would ruin the effects of their efforts.
Id.
78 Bush and Folger point out the differences in how mediators listen to the content of
the story. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16, at 102-03.
The problem-solving mediator comes to a session ready to hear a barrage of factual
and emotional information, which can be sorted and organized into negotiable
issues ... the transformative mediator.., comes to the session ready to witness an
intense interaction and exchange between the parties that, because it involves
difficulties faced by each party as well as hostile perceptions of each by the other, is
filled with myriad opportunities for empowerment and recognition.
Id.
79 Waldman, Identifying Social Norms, supra note 7, at 756 ("Indeed, in delineating
these three models, I do not mean to suggest that they are always, or even usually, used
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after the agreement to mediate is signed, the literature strongly suggests that
mediators have a pattern of practice that would basically fall into one of a
number of specific models.80
V. IDENTIFYING BASIC ELEMENTS
As the mediation profession engages in the discourse to understand the
differences in mediator practices, we first need to identify the similarities. In
addition to defining the parameters in place so that the parties have exercised
self-determination, it is also incumbent upon mediators to explain the basic
components of mediation.81 Certain elements would ideally be present: (1)
self-determination of the parties; (2) the good faith intention of the parties to
negotiate and disclose all relevant information; (3) impartiality and neutrality
of the mediator in relation to the parties and the outcome; and (4) a balance
of power and fairness. In addition to these four, a fifth must be discussed
fully, weighed carefully, and mutually decided upon by the parties prior to
signing the agreement to mediate-(5) confidentiality. 82 Each of these
elements has been the subject of considerable commentary. Defining our
terms points out the complexities of concepts we often assume have
commonly understood meanings.
A. Self-Determination
Self-Determination is seen as the bedrock of the mediation process,
distinguishing it from the other ADR processes. 83 Components of self-
determination include: (1) having the necessary information for
singly. Rather, many mediators will combine these various models, depending on the
nature of the dispute.").
80 See Kressel et al., supra note 20, at 73 ("There was no evidence that mediator
style was a function of case characteristics: all mediators had cases comparable on such
pre-mediation factors as level of parental conflict, parental psychopathology, and whether
mediation was occurring prior or after the divorce.").
81 See Appendix B, Elements, Strategies, and Categories of Mediation Chart.
82 While confidentiality has been presented as one of the main advantages of
mediation, some argue that there is no evidence to back up the notion that, without it,
mediation would be less effective. See Scott H. Hughes, A Closer Look, Disp. RESOL.
MAG., Winter 1998, at 14, 16 ("There is no empirical work to demonstrate a connection
between [confidentiality] privileges and the ultimate success of mediation. Although
parties may have an expectation of privacy, no showing has been made that fulfilling this
expectation is crucial to the outcome of mediation.").
83 See Kovach and Love, supra note 3, at 84.
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decisionmaking 84; (2) the ability to make autonomous decisions,8 5 including
consenting to the mediation 86; (3) the capacity to articulate one's perspective,
to negotiate in one's own best interest, and to evaluate options and
alternatives 87; and (4) the ability to carry out an agreement.
Attorneys must also determine capacity in order to represent their clients.
In carrying out the wishes of the client, attorneys must assess the ability of
the client to state his or her desires. 88 This applies to mediators as well.89 It
may be difficult in any given situation to sort out capacity from disability
because the two may frequently be confused and conflated in our minds. We
should not automatically assume that someone disabled in one area is
incapacitated in general! 90 Nor can we assume that someone who appears to
84 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 71, at 781 ("The principle of informed consent in the
lawyer-client relationship is a similar principle to that in medicine. Clients should be
educated about their choices and participate in decisionmaking.").
85 Id. at 789 ("Respect for autonomy and its legal equivalent, the right of self-
determination, is widely accepted as the intrinsic value of mediation, and the principle of
informed consent provides the structural framework through which this value is measured
in mediation.").
86 Id. at 790-91 ("[M]ediation autonomy operates as a corrective to paternalism. As
a limiting principle, it gives the mediator power to control only the process in which
parties' decision making occurs, while the parties retain the power to decide and control
the outcome.").
87 See Moffitt, supra note 33, at 15.
In describing common negotiation dynamics, Roger Fisher, William Ury and Bruce
Patton distinguish between 'options' and alternatives.' Options... are those ideas
that could be part of an agreement between the negotiating parties. Alternatives are
those actions which a party can take without the consent of the other party.
Id.
88 Erica Wood, Addressing Capacity: What is the Role of the Mediator?, at
http://www.mediate.corn/articles/woodEl.cfm (last visited Jan. 25, 2005) ("Lawyers also
routinely must consider capacity. They must decide whether a client has capacity to
execute a will, a durable power of attorney, trust or other legal document--or even
capacity to retain the lawyer.").
89 Id. ("The ADA Mediation Guidelines name several factors to be considered: 'The
mediator should ascertain that a party understands the nature of the mediation process,
who the parties are, the role of the mediator, the parties' relationship to the mediator, and
the issues at hand."').
90 Kathleen Blank, It Is Not a Disability Issue, at
http://www.mediate.com/articles/blankKl.cfm (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
While providing necessary accommodations for people with disabilities can seem
challenging to the mediator, the lack of accommodation should not be confused with
the lack of capacity to participate. Mediators should presume that people with
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be "in control" and "capable" is not in fact experiencing emotions that are
clouding their thinking. 91
Parties must have the capacity to understand and carry out all the
requirements of the mediation process in order to meet the definition of self-
determination. Mediators must have the ability to explain these requirements
and the awareness to know if parties are understanding them.92 Otherwise,
the parties will not be sufficiently informed to exercise self-determination
regarding the decision whether or not to participate. 93
B. Good Faith
Efforts to agree on the criteria for "good faith" have also proven difficult.
Concerns abound regarding the increased regulation of good faith by the
legal system, which many see as jeopardizing the original function of
mediation as an alternative to litigation.94 Some argue for punitive measures
for parties who do not show good faith, such as payment of legal and
mediation fees. Court-referred cases carry the added weight of judicial
physical and mental disabilities, like everyone else, have the capacity to participate
in the mediation process with the appropriate accommodation.
Id. at 3.
91 Tricia S. Jones & Andrea Bodtker, Mediating with Heart in Mind: Addressing
Emotion in Mediation Practice, 2001 NEGOT. J. 217, 218 (2001) ("Exploring the
implications of physiologic elements of emotion-how the body responds to emotion-
enables us to discuss the impact of emotional flooding and emotional contagion on
mediation process. And in understanding the cognitive aspects of emotion, we argue that
emotional reappraisal is a critical tool for mediators.").
92 Judy Cohen, Fulfilling Your Obligation on Mediation Capacity, at
http://www.mediate.con/ADAMediation/editorial5.cfm (last visited Oct. 22, 2004)
("Mediators need to be concerned when parties face obstacles to self-determination, a
core value in mediation. When a party appears to have difficulty comprehending the
mediation process, or seems unable to participate actively, the mediator needs to step
back and explore those obstacles with the party.").
93 See Weckstein, supra note 41, at 508 ("While differing somewhat in language and
detail, most modem definitions of mediation contain two common elements: (1) third-
party facilitation of dispute settlement, and (2) lack of third-party power to determine the
resolution of the dispute. In other words, the principle of self-determination is
paramount.") (internal citations omitted).
94 Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested, Recommended, or
Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 575, 581 (1997) ("Mediation, even within the
context of the legal system, should maintain certain characteristics if it is to be a separate,
viable alternative to adjudication. Otherwise, mediating will be left as nothing but another
pretrial procedural hoop in the litigation process.").
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backing in which penalizing bad faith puts mediator confidentiality at risk.95
The issues involved in making such determinations would clearly threaten
the concept of mediation as offering an informal setting. 96
Many mediators may be unaware of the current arguments for and
against sanctions regarding good faith, and may be caught off-guard if the
issue arises. While some practitioners propose that detailed criteria be used,
for the purposes of this Article I will hold that good faith is defined as the
intention and authority to negotiate and to provide necessary documentation
or information. Ultimately, the determination rests with each mediator to
assess if the parties have met their standards. 97
C. Impartiality and Neutrality
Defining the concepts of impartiality and neutrality addresses the
potential ability of the mediator in any given situation to recognize and
monitor her or his own biases. 98 This ideal is quite unrealistic. Parties and
95 Roger L. Carter, Oh Ye of Little[Good] Faith: Questions, Concerns and
Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations, 2002 J. DISP.
RESOL. 367, 392 (2002).
Zealous enforcement of good faith standards in substantive areas of mediation
imperils the confidentiality of the process. Many "good faith" statutes and court
rules require mediators to report whether parties participated in good faith .... In
the event of a hearing on bad faith sanctions, the mediator will likely be required to
testify.
Id.
9 6 Id. at 376-77.
Commentators opposed to sanctions recognize the problem of bad faith conduct, but
believe that the cure is worse than the disease. They see mediation's unique appeal
as being its open and safe environment where disputants can freely and comfortably
discuss their interests and views. Rules requiring good faith and threatening the
imposition of sanctions, they contend, will hang over the parties like a Damoclean
sword, inhibiting the process rather than abetting it.
Id.
97 See Kovach, supra note 94, at 618 ("[E]ach mediator may have discretion in how
she chooses to enforce the good faith commitment. At minimum a mediator should
terminate the session in the event she determines that the process will do harm.").
98 See Weckstein, supra note 41, at 533.
"Impartiality" is distinguished from "neutrality." The former term... refers to
performing the mediation function, in word or deed, free from favoritism or bias,
and for the purpose of aiding a resolution of the dispute and not to benefit a
particularparty .... "Neutrality" refers to the mediator's relationship, if any, with
the disputants or the dispute. It seeks to avoid use of a mediator who, by reason of
background, experience, financial interest, or relations with one or more of the
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mediators all come to mediation with complex systems of intersecting ideas,
experiences, and perspectives that provide the lens through which each
individual views the world.99 Some of these systems are conscious, and
others are unconscious.100 Mediators have little other than self-assessment of
their own behaviors based on personal and professional ethics, to guide them.
Thus, determining the ability to maintain impartiality and neutrality is based
on a highly subjective standard.
If postmodernist theory were acknowledged in mediation as it has been
in other disciplines, 01 the idea that no one can be "objective" would be
commonly accepted.' 02 Mediators are not immune from the influence of their
unconscious privileges and attitudes. 10 3 At present, we use a vague set of
criteria to determine impartiality and neutrality, which are monitored by the
mediator. Only if an offense by a mediator becomes glaringly obvious might
the parties have the awareness to declare it as a reason to end the
parties, may be prejudiced or biased for or against a party. Neutrality incorporates
concerns with any conflict of interest of the mediator.
Id.
99 See john a. powell, The Multiple Self Exploring Between and Beyond Modernity
andPostmodernity, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1481, 1483 (1997).
At the base of the criticisms of Grillo and other feminists is the reformulation of the
self as a site constituted and fragmented, at least partially, by the intersections of
various categories of domination/oppression such as race, gender, and sexual
orientation. Thus, far from being a unitary and static phenomenon untainted by
experience, one's core identity is made up of the various discourses and structures
that shape society and one's experience within it.
Id.
100 Id. at 1514 ("As psychoanalysis asserts, unconscious thought processes play a
primary role in the interaction between the self and the 'other.' Thus, 'requiring proof of
conscious or intentional motivation... ignores much of what we understand about how
the human mind works."') (quoting Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, The Edge, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987)).
101 JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A NEW APPROACH
TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 41 (2000) ("Postmodern thinking suggests that there is no
single definable reality. Rather there is a great diversity in the ways we make meaning in
our lives.").
102 See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16, at 70 ("Mediators enter conflicts. They
become participants in the unfolding interaction and have influence on the way it
develops.").
103 See Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the
Master's House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 16, 30 (1995) ("[E]ach of us has a limited
view of the world.., we have a better chance of forming a vision of a post-patriarchal,
post-racist society both by trusting in our own experiences and by seeking out voices that
are drowned out by essentialism in all its forms.").
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mediation.' 04 Under most circumstances unrepresented parties unfamiliar
with mediation might be hard pressed to determine, other than by their
subjective sense or feeling, if a mediator had lost impartiality or neutrality.105
Widely held assumptions about the necessity of impartiality and neutrality
may not be substantiated by the research. 106
D. Balance of Power and Fairness
The relationship of the parties invariably represents the roles and
hierarchies in which they engage one another in the "outside" world. The
hierarchical relations between parties outside the mediation are re-enacted in
the mediation. 10 7 Any idea of balancing power between husbands and wives,
104 See Deborah M. Kolb & Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Mediation Through a Disciplinary
Prism, in RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 235-36 (Max H. Bazerman et
al. eds., 3d ed. 1991). The authors define the role of norms or values in the mediation as
relating to the domain of communication theory. They describe one body of research
which "portrays the mediator as the manager of meaning between disputants, each of
whom may be operating from different beliefs, values and communication systems." Id.
105 See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16, at 72-73. The authors articulate reasons it is
difficult for parties to identify loss of impartiality and/or neutrality when it reflects the
culture at large and even the parties' own belief systems:
[T]hose who tell the Oppression Story... claim that mediators' moves-their
management of the interaction, arguments, and suggestion-typically favor the
stronger parties' interests in a conflict. This is sometimes because mediators bring
their own oppressive biases to the issues that arise in mediation and sometimes
because they stay within an oppressive frame that the parties themselves bring to the
table .... In this view, mediator influence is pernicious because it perpetuates the
evils of inequality and oppression.
(internal citations committed).
106 Kenneth Kressel & Dean G. Pruitt, Themes in the Mediation of Social Conflict,
41 J. Soc. ISSUES 190 (1985).
[I]n many cases the mediators' greater closeness to one party forms the basis the
mediator's acceptability to the other party .... Kolb (1985) makes the point that, in
certain instances, mediators attempt to create an impression of neutrality by
selectively aligning themselves first with one party, then with the other.
Id.
107 See WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 101, at 40 ("[L]anguage is performative,
and its use a form of social action .... The implication of this view is that mediation is a
site where social action is always taking place rather than just being talked about. It is
where lives and relations are being produced and reproduced."); see also Dorothy Della
Noce, Seeing Theory In Practice: An Analysis of Empathy in Mediation, 1991 NEGOT. J.
271, 273 (1991) ("Discourse (talk and text in its social context) is a material practice; that
is discourse has real and practical social consequences.").
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employers and workers, landlords and tenants, or parents and children in a
two-hour (or longer) session is delusional. 10 8 While mediation has promoted
itself as contextual in comparison with the law,109 it limits its scope to the
issues put forward by the parties. If neither party is aware of, or chooses to
raise, issues regarding social-political power imbalances, the mediator is
under no mandate to do so. °10 At the same time that we continually address
the dilemma of operating "in the shadow of the law," 111 mediators are
offering ever-changing ADR processes 1 2 as options within the legal system,
108 See Richard Delgado, Alternative Dispute Resolution Conflict As Pathology: An
Essay for Trina Grillo, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1391, 1407-08 (1997)
ADR seems to be taking hold most strongly in those areas of greatest power
imbalance between the parties .... [P]owerful parties are able to make lawsuits go
away by diverting them to ADR. Recent empirical studies ... show that mediation
produces outcomes that favor the stronger party, even more so than the standard , in-
court lawsuits.
Id.
109 Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
L.J. 1545, 1564 (1991).
[Wthile one of the principle justifications for introducing mediation into the divorce
process is that context will be substituted for abstract principles, in fact, by
eliminating discussion of the past, context-in the sense of the relationship's
history-is removed. The result is that we are left with neither principles nor context
as a basis for decisionmaking.
Id.
110 Michael A. McCormick, Confronting Social Injustice as a Mediator, 14
MEDIATION Q. 293 (1997).
[I]mpartiality is central to our utility in conducting a dispute resolution process that
allows the disputants to define the terms of any agreement. But, as so many other
practitioners and critics have noted, singular reliance on the principal of impartiality
too often leaves existing power imbalances unchallenged and thus provides nothing
better than second-class justice for the less powerful.
Id.
111 See generally Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); see also Judith L. Maute,
Mediator Accountability: Responding to Fairness Concerns, 1990 J. DISP. RESOL. 347,
352 n.23 (1990).
Law is a relevant reference point for the mediation. To ignore law would deprive the
parties of its value in helping them reach a fair agreement. Yet the law and
predictions of how it would apply to the instant facts need not bind the parties,
excluding the parties from using their own sense of fairness as a basis for decision.
Id.
112 See Glossary of ADR Processes, supra note 70, at 3.
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which are fraught with enormous contradictions and inconsistencies."13 The.
meanings proposed here are:
Balance of power: intervention by the mediator at any point that she or
he perceives that either party is not demonstrating self-determination;
intervention methods and tools vary according to the model used by the
mediator; parties should be informed before the agreement to mediate about
the model and methods of intervention likely to be used by the mediator.
Fairness: accountability of the mediator to ensure procedures that do not
privilege one party over others, to treat all with equal respect, to see that all
parties have equal access to information and advice in particular regarding
legal norms, and to prevent or end abusive behavior.
Impartiality: the ability of the mediator to maintain non-preferential
attitudes and behaviors towards all parties in a dispute; it is the ethical
responsibility of the mediator to withdraw if she or he has lost the ability to
remain impartial.
Neutrality: the alleged ability of the mediator to remain uninvested in the
outcome of a dispute, to be aware of any contamination of neutrality, and to
withdraw if he or she has lost it.
Balance of power between parties, and between the mediator and parties,
is a relative and shifting proposition.' 14 Fairness in outcomes can be seen
Other ADR Processes: Hybrid and Flexible Tools for Dispute Resolution. One of the
most exciting aspects of ADR is the flexibility provided attorneys and their clients in
fashioning the most appropriate process to solve a particular problem and resolve the
dispute. Although the best-known ADR processes are described above, there is no
rule that limits parties or attorneys to these definitions. An experienced ADR
provider can extract and combine key elements of various ADR processes to create
the best opportunity and process for resolving a particular dispute.
Id.
113 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR Representation: A Road Map of
Critical Issues, DisP. RESOL. MAG, Winter 1997, at 3, 4.
There remain some tricky ambiguities in the application of traditional rules of ethics
to ADR. Model Rule 3.3 requires a lawyer to disclose "to a tribunal" legal authority
in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be "directly adverse to the
position of the client." Is court-sponsored mediation such a "tribunal?" Is an early
neutral evaluation session conducted under a court program's requirements, but held
in a private law office, such a tribunal?
Id.
114 See Weckstein, supra note 41, at 545 ("Allowing qualified mediators to relate
relevant professional information-whether legal, financial, technical, or psychological-
will help empower the parties by providing an opportunity to educate them to make
informed choices .... The choice is still in the hands of the disputants.").
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either from the parties' point of view as satisfied or not satisfied, 115 or from
society's point of view, in upholding commonly-accepted legal and social
standards. 116 In some models, this means that the mediator safeguards the
parties' equal access to relevant factual information and advice, and makes
sure all parties understand their choices and the consequences of them, in
relation to their self-interests. 117 These remedies alone, however, do not fully
address the problem of balancing power. 118
The first critical point in ensuring fairness is in the initial screening
process. 19 Mediators are expected to assess their own ability to maintain
impartiality and neutrality 120 and to balance power. 121 The reality is clearly
115 See Maute, supra note 111, at 348 ("As to substantive fairness, the probable
litigated outcome should serve as a reference point; the parties are free to find a solution
that better serves their personal values and concerns.").
116 Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant
Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1317, 1327
(1995).
For some mediation advocates, fair outcomes are in the eyes of the beholder-if
parties believe the outcome to be fair, then it is. For others, fair settlements must
creatively incorporate a variety of values and goals, rather than exclusively legal
ones, and parties should arrive at them without pressure.
Id.
117 See Waldman, The Challenge of Certification, supra note 7, at 734 ("[A]
mediator following the norm-educating model believes the parties should receive
information about legal entitlements and relevant financial, technical, or psychological
data before making irrevocable decisions.").
118 See Weckstein, supra note 41, at 540.
Susskind's point, that a mediator's activist interventions are offered equally for all
but may have a disproportionate effect on those least able to help themselves is a
valid one ... . There is no bias for or against either party, only a bias in favor of the
integrity of the process so that all parties have the opportunity to be informed and,
thus, empowered to engage in true self-determination.
Id. (emphasis added).
119 See Maute, supra note 111, at 351 ("Screening can also protect for fairness by
excluding disputes where there are vast disparities in bargaining power between the
parties.").
120 Charles Pou Jr., Enough Rules Already! Making Ethical Dispute Resolution a
Reality, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2004, at 20.
Many basic training programs treat ethics as a fortieth-hour afterthought. ADR
practitioners often are not especially aware of, or thoughtful about, ethical standards.
Numerous program administrators complain that trainers often are reticent about
taking positions, and that a good percentage of neutrals do not recognize when an
ethics issue arises.
Id.
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that the ideal of fairness is difficult to quantify or measure. The criteria to
evaluate it is, in large part, subjective. 122
E. Confidentiality
No less troublesome than the other elements is the question of
confidentiality. Mediators initially promised confidentiality as a sweeping
guarantee of protection.'2 3 At present, there are a rapidly growing number of
regulations that differ widely from state to state. 124 The Uniform Mediation
Act (UMA) is an attempt to create "a consistent and predictable structure for
mediation." 125 After much deliberation, the crafters of the UMA defined
confidentiality in relation to court proceedings but did not go further, leaving
it up to the parties to define it, in essence on a contractual basis. 12 6 The UMA
also extends protection to mediators, even when the parties wish the mediator
to disclose information.127
121 See Maute, supra note 111, at 354 ("Compromise is an equitable solution only
between equals: between unequals it 'inevitably produces inequality."').
122 See McEwen et al., supra note 116, at 1325.
Mediation advocates.., confidently refer to the empirical evidence regarding
parties' perceptions of mediation and dismiss the critics' examples as exceptional
and not reflective of good mediation practice. Using anecdotes, they contend that
well-trained, sensitive, ethical mediators compensate for power imbalances between
parties, do not exert pressures to settle, and remain impartial ....
Id.
123 Philip J. Harter, The Uniform Mediation Act: An Essential Framework For Self-
Determination, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 251 (2002) ("[M]ediators often promise more
confidentiality than they can actually deliver as a matter of law and since many parties
are unrepresented by counsel, they may rely on this assurance to their detriment.").
124 Id.
[T]he law governing confidentiality varies by subject matter within a state and by
jurisdiction within a substantive area. Moreover, the differences can be quite
significant .... [T]he parties to a mediation can never know just where a challenge
to confidentiality might be brought or even whether it will be directly related to the
subject on the table.
Id.
125 Id. at 252.
126 Id. at 256 ("[T]he provision explicitly authorizes the parties to define their own
confidentiality by saying that a contract to that end is enforceable.").
127 Id. at 254. "[T]he mediator can refuse a discovery request for or refuse to testify
about a mediation communication, but the mediator cannot block others from doing so."
Id.
804
[Vol. 20:3 20051
MEDIATION THEORY VS. PRACTICE
At the heart of the debate is the contradiction between the parties' desire
to maintain confidentiality and the public's right to know. 128 Since the job of
the court is to weigh the needs and interests of the society against individual
needs and rights, it always has the power to override confidentiality. The
Federal Administrative Dispute Resolution Act spells this out:
Confidentiality can be overridden when
a court determines that such testimony is necessary to... prevent harm to
the public health and safety, of sufficient magnitude in the particular case
outweigh the integrity of dispute resolution proceedings in general by
reducing the confidence of parties in future cases that their communications
will remain confidential. 129
During the explanation of the agreement to mediate, especially in regard
to confidentiality, the mediator is practicing Norm-Advocating mediation.
The mediator must convey all legal information in order for the parties to
exercise informed consent. Confidentiality has legal ramifications and many
legal exemptions for parties to consider.' 30 Maintaining confidentiality is a
complex issue for lawyer-mediators and attorneys representing clients in
mediation. As ADR processes continue to evolve, more questions are raised
about what is private and what is public. 131
128 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New
Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyer's Responsibilities, 38 S.
TEX. L. REv. 407, 412-13 (1997) ("To what extent can private parties contract for ADR
(without public scrutiny) when what they are contracting for is legal dispute resolution, a
function committed to the public sphere? Under what circumstances should courts review
private action?").
129 5 U.S.C. § 574(a)(4), (b)(5) (2003).
130 See Edward F. Sherman, Confidentiality in ADR Proceedings: Policy Issues
Arising from the Texas Experience, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 541, 542-43 (1997).
The policy issues in the debate over ADR confidentiality seem to fall into two
categories--"process" issues relating to what extent confidentiality is necessary to
achieve the objectives of ADR within the context of the particular dispute, and
"public access" issues relating to claims of overriding public interest in insuring
public access to information communicated in the ADR proceeding.
Id.
131 Concerns abound among legal scholars and practitioners about the right to
privacy and have escalated since the passage of the PATRIOT Act in 2001. Act of Oct.
26, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1). The purpose and
full title of the act are as follows:
To deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to
enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes. Be it enacted
by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
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Confidentiality, as a rare application of the right to privacy, 132 is pivotal
in many ways in the mediation process. Parties should address other
stipulations regarding confidentiality in addition to the decisions regarding
the court. Under the proposed UMA, additional stipulations would be
considered a contract once the parties' agreement to mediate is signed. 133
VI. RECOGNIZING STRATEGIES
Riskin and others have described tools, strategies, and outcomes, but not
the boundaries of the processes. These descriptors confuse strategies with
"styles" or models. Both evaluation (of the dynamics of the mediation) and
facilitation, for example, might be seen as strategies, based on what the
mediator theorizes is obstructing movement in negotiation. 134 If we
recognize that a combination of relevant external norms 135 and the internal
Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the "Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001.
Id. The protection of the privacy of U.S. citizens, which was shaky at best, is now more
severely threatened. Thus, the fact that parties must come to agreement about whether or
not to waive confidentiality before they sign the agreement to mediate presents an
unusual opportunity for parties to control the flow of information, even in relation to the
court. In addition to the legal decision about confidentiality, the acknowledgment of other
people with whom the parties would like to discuss the mediation (informal
confidentiality) builds trust by providing an example of transparency between the parties.
How information has been conveyed and used is often one of the major issues between
parties. Discussing both legal and informal aspects of confidentiality allows the parties to
take responsibility for the information they are about to share.
132 See ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT To PRIVACY xiv
(1995).
One hundred years ago, Justice Louis D. Brandeis called the right to privacy "the
right to be let alone." Eloquent in its simplicity, Brandeis' phrase seems to sum up
what most Americans have in mind when they think of privacy. However, legally, it
offers no guidance at all. Coveting an indefinable right is one thing; enforcing it in a
court of law is another.
Id.
133 See Harter, supra note 123, at 256. ("[T]he provision explicitly authorizes the
parties to define their own confidentiality by saying that a contract to that end is
enforceable.").
134 See Silbey & Merry, supra note 14, at 7 ("The process of mediation, and the role
of the mediator in particular, is shaped by the strategies adopted to cope with this tension
between the need to settle and the lack of power to do so.").
135 See Waldman, Identifying Social Norms, supra note 7, at 707.
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values 136 of the parties are the reference points in all mediations, we can then
explain which model or models and what interventions are being chosen by
the mediator. Contrary to some early mediation concepts, 137 giving
information is not outside the realm of the mediator; it is crucial in order for
parties to exercise self-determination.138
In an argument about mediator styles, Jeffrey Stempel claims that most
mediators use an eclectic mix. 139 In essence, accepting his decree means that
mediators will be even less likely to be able to define for parties what they
are actually doing. Stempel's argument that parties will have no interest in
hearing "bursts of self-conscious rhetoric about changing modes,"' 140 is based
on his contention that parties expect "one-stop shopping" in mediation' 4' and
Although the mediation literature is rich with 'thick descriptions' of various
mediator styles, it lacks a theoretical framework that takes adequate account of the
disparate role social norms play in different mediation models .... Heightened
attention to the role of social norms in mediation is necessary to allow mediators to
adequately explain their methodologies and to allow clients to supply informed
consent to mediator interventions.
Id.
136 JOSEPH P. FOLGER & MARSHALL SCOTT POOLE, WORKING THROUGH CONFLICT:
A COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVE 71 (1984) ("Any idea, decision or outcome considered
during a conflict interaction is assessed according to the values each member holds.").
137 See Weckstein, supra note 41, at 522 (quoting Kenneth Kressel, Frances Butler:
Questions That Lead to Answers In Child Custody Mediation, in WHEN TALK WORKS,
supra note 17, at 43).
The persistence of the nondirective theology owes much to the insecurity and lack of
experience of the first generation of family mediators and the uncertainty within the
field as to how to draw the line between the mediator's mandate to resolve disputes
and, at the same time, avoid the act or appearance of favoritism or strong-arming.
Id.
138 Id. at 504.
[I]t should not be considered improper for the mediator to serve as a source of
pertinent information. Likewise, if the mediator's style is to offer that information
unless the parties decline it, the mediator should be free to do so ethically. Self-
determination extends to the disputants' willingness or unwillingness to be exposed
to a mediator's educational efforts or evaluations.
Id.
139 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Identifying Real Dichotomies Underlying the False
Dichotomy: Twenty-First Century Mediation in an Eclectic Regime, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL.
371, 388 (2000) ("Essentially, the 'war' is over, and eclectic mediation has carried the
day and probably will continue to be the dominant form of mediation.").
140 Id. at 384.
141 Id.
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care only about the results.142 What Stempel dismisses as academic concerns,
others might call the mediator's ethical responsibility to support parties' self-
determination. 143
What if we were to replace the word "style" with "strategy"? The word
strategy comes from the Greek strategos, which means "a general"; it
describes the skill of managing or planning. 144 If mediators each come with a
basic theory of what causes conflict, 145 they would then each tend to have a
set of strategies to overcome the obstacles identified by their theory. 146
There are a few common strategies that mediators use to one degree or
another: (a) establishing the frame or process; (b) clarifying issues through
storytelling; (c) intervention through the use of empathy, tools, and/or
information; (d) shifting awareness of self-interests by focusing on the
present and future; and (e) reality testing by referencing social and legal
norms.
142 Id. ("[T]hey [the parties] are not nearly as concerned as academicians about the
precise techniques deployed as long as the process brings acceptable reso!ution.").
143 See Carter, supra note 95, at 396.
Empowerment and ADR go hand-in-hand. Autonomy and ADR go hand-in-hand.
ADK promotes such democratic values as self-determination and freedom from
interference by the state. Early backers of alternative dispute resolution believed
they had found a solution to some of the worst problems of adversary justice. As
ADR has become "less alternative" and more institutionalized, disturbing trends
have emerged.
Id.; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 218 (describing the underlying theme of
all mediation as "a commitment to democratic participation and democratic theory in the
resolution of social, personal and political issues").
144 See WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1979).
145 See Della Noce, supra note 107, at 272.
Theory may seem far removed from the moment-to-moment demands of conflict
interaction and resolution. Yet theory-implicit or explicit, sophisticated or naive-
shapes the practice of conflict resolution... theory is the "why" underlying
interventions, the rationale for what intervention is used when and how it is enacted
and played out in interaction.
Id.
146 See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16, at 55-56.
An orientation to conflict is a worldview of conflict. It tells us how to think about
conflict .... An orientation to conflict suggests a view of what the ideal response to
conflict should be. It prescribes what people in conflict should do to reach successful
results-results that the orientation itself defines and prizes.
Id.
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A. Establishing the Frame or Process
Establishing the frame or process is done in all models, though perhaps
more or less overtly. Mediators often claim authority as representatives of the
court or as professionals in settling disputes. 147 They control the flow and
substance of the parties' communications 148 based on their expertise in
helping people reach understanding. Empowering parties, claiming authority,
and controlling the process 149 are all part and parcel of establishing the frame
or process. 150
B. Clarifying Issues Through Storytelling
Negotiators might agree that we share the idea that taking apart the
elements of a dispute will uncover hidden interests and motivations. Thus,
storytelling is figural. In the "narrative orientation"151 and the transformative
model, 152 practitioners work to create a shift by encouraging participants to
re-think the problem or story. 153 Re-framing what the parties say into new
perspectives is one way this strategy is used,154 though how re-framing is
147 See Silbey & Merry, supra note 14, at 12-13.
148 Id. at 15 ("Control of the substantive issues seems to involve four distinct steps:
broadening, selecting, concretizing, and finally, postponing issues.").
149 See Riskin, supra note 5, at 32 ("[M]ediators can direct (or push) the parties
toward particular outcomes through 'selective facilitation'-directing discussion of
outcomes the mediator favors, while not promoting discussions of outcomes the mediator
does not favor-without explicitly evaluating a particular outcome.").
150 See Silbey & Merry, supra note 14, at 12-13.
151 See WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 101, at 3 ("The narrative perception is that
people tend to organize their experiences in story form. The narrative metaphor draws
attention to the ways in which we use stories to make sense of our lives and
relationships.").
152 See Sara Cobb, Creating Sacred Space: Toward a Second Generation Dispute
Resolution Practice, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1017, 1021 (2001) ("[P]roductive moral
discussion is not simply talking about values, it is the process of evolving the content of
narratives so that there is a shift in the moral corollaries associated with a story.").
153 Id. at 1029.
This kind of observation is consistent with the features von Foerster attributed to
second-order systems in which the process of observing the conflict system brings
forth the conflict system. In other words, the nature of the "reality" that is
constructed is dependent upon the nature of the descriptions that "observers" make
of the system.
Id.
154 See Silbey & Merry, supra note 14, at 26.
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defined may differ from one model to another. 155 For some, mediation is
seen as an exercise of democratic participation, 5 6 exemplified by the
opportunity to have one's story heard. Feeding back what was said during
storytelling is seen as a way for the mediator to model a way of listening for
common feelings and values. 157 Storytelling is also credited as a way for
parties to vent their emotions, allowing them to move on to negotiation. 158
C. Intervention Through Empathy, Tools, and/or Information
Intervention is inherent to mediation since the presence of a neutral is in
itself an intervention. The choice of interventions may differ widely in the
various models. For example, the use of empathy might figure more
prominently in therapy or transformative models, while introducing
information would be less likely in those models than in Norm-Educating
models. The range of interventions is unlimited. In this area, the mediator's
skill and flexibility is paramount.
Mediators do not ask the parties to accept the validity of the language of
relationships for representing disputants' grievances. It is not consensually achieved
nor the result of full disclosure but, instead, is imposed upon them. Although the
parties engage in the mediator's language, this says nothing about the parties'
acceptance of it as the best way to express their differences ....
Id.
155 See Moffitt, supra note 33, at 37.
Mediators often talk of "framing" as an extremely important task, but there is no
uniform definition of framing within mediation literature .... None of us is a blank
slate, and none of us can expect to evaluate each incoming piece of observable data
independently. Instead, we build up "deeply held internal images of how the world
works" and use those to process incoming information.
Id.
156 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 218 ("In one way or another all of these
works suggest a commitment to democratic participation and democratic theory in the
resolution of social, personal, and political issues.").
157 See Silbey & Merry, supra note 14, at 26.
Disputants commonly begin mediation by describing their problems in terms of
everyday experience as a sequence of personal exchanges; they may also describe
their problem in the language of claims and rights typical of legal discourse. The
aim of mediators is to convert these accounts into a language of relationships.
Id.
158 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 1420 ("While mediation promises the
'venting' of feelings and the allowance of emotions that would be inadmissible in a
formal court proceeding, the reality, as described by Trina, is a tightly controlled
'permitted' discourse which constantly polices by reminding that 'anger is
counterproductive' to good solutions and long-term healthy relationships.").
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D. Shifting Awareness of Self-Interests by Focusing on the Present and
Future
Common to all mediation models is the attempt to shift the parties'
perspective of their self-interests. The potential shift the mediator is looking
for can be produced by uncovering underlying interests and motivations. 159
This is the meaning of the word resolve, which is to loosen, to untie, to
separate out the parts, to re-solve.160 Keeping the parties' attention focused
on the present and the future rather than on past hurts and wrongs is a
frequently used and often problematic strategy. 161 While mediation has
marketed itself as more contextual than litigious, allowing parties to maintain
control over decisions, in practice it may actually separate issues from
context by discouraging discussion of past acts. 162
E. Reality Testing by Referencing Social and Legal Norms
Reality testing, used in multiple ways by mediators, offers an unlimited
scope of norms to reference and gives the mediators enormous power to
influence the direction of the mediation.' 63 In Waldman's theory, reality
159 See Riskin, supra note 5, at 21.
This basic idea appeared in various formulations. Some spoke of the parties'
underlying interests, the goals or motivations that prompted their positions. Others
talked about healing or repairing relationships, reconciliation, or genuine resolution
(as opposed to just settling). And virtually all mediation training programs at that
time [when writing the 1996 article] emphasized such approaches.
Id.
160 See WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, supra note 144, at
1541.
161 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 1424.
[T]he past cannot be erased in mediation's focus on the future. It is the claim for
reparations, for apology, for acknowledgment, and for affirmative action. In
mediation, as in civil rights struggles, we must look back before we can move
forward. True resolution of conflicts requires us to deal with, bring forward and not
suppress, conflicts and past, as well as current, pains.
Id.
162 Id. at 1419 ("In one of her most trenchant criticisms of the divorce mediation
process, Trina suggests that, 'by eliminating discussion of the past, context-in the sense
of the relationship's history-is removed. The result is that we are left with neither
principles nor context as a basis for decision making."') (quoting Grillo, supra note 109,
at 1564).
163 See Moffitt, supra note 33, at 14.
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testing, in which'norms are referenced, would be a primary means of
differentiating one model from another. 164
VII. WHAT IS A MODEL?
A. Defining Models
If we use the metaphor of building a house, we can identify different
models: Victorian, Ranch, Dutch Colonial, and so forth. Each model
provides shelter, warmth, and space, but the ambiance and utility of each
may be quite different. If each mediation model is analogous to a set of
blueprints for a specific type of house, the processes can be made clear and
distinct. At the same time, they are all identifiable as mediation. Recognizing
that in mediation, as in housing construction, models may borrow from each
other, the categories are still useful in determining key elements that separate
one from another. 65
Use of the words "model," "style," "approach," and "orientation" has
been a source of confusion in mediation literature. Dorothy Della Noce
defines six criteria for establishing a model. 166 She argues that a model is
"something more substantial than a practitioner's preference or idiosyncratic
Many mediators feel that it is part of their responsibility to help the parties assess the
risks and benefits of failing to settle through mediation. This is commonly referred
to as "reality testing".... [T]he phrase implies that an objective reality exists and
suggests that the mediator somehow has access to that reality in a way the parties do
not.
Id.
164 See Waldman, Identifying Social Norms, supra note 7, at 707 ("This article
proposes a refinement of mediation theory in an effort to clarify discussion and
comprehension of the field. It seeks to separate out the variety of processes grouped
together as mediation and distinguish them based on their divergent treatment of social
norms.").
165 Id. at 707 ("Although the models are distinct, reflecting separate approaches to
social and legal norms and pursuing slightly different goals, they are not mutually
exclusive. A mediator may use each of these models in different cases, or, indeed, when
handling different issues in the same case.").
166 See Della Noce, supra note 10, at 136. Della Noce says that the six criteria are
(1) "A mediation model should be situated within the relevant research in the field" (Id.
at 136) (2) "Mediation models must be grounded in social conflict theory" (Id. at 137)
(3) "If a model is constructed in phases, all phases should be thoroughly explicated" (Id.
at 138) (4) "Explicit contrasts and comparisons to other models should be presented as an
aid to understanding" (Id. at 139) (5) "A coherent model must identify and provide
guidance for the ethical dilemmas that its practitioners will encounter" (Id. at 139) (6)
"'How to' is not sufficient ... but it is necessary" (Id. at 140).
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style. It suggests an example of practice that is capable and worthy of
imitation, a clear and detailed exemplar to which a practitioner can refer for
guidance." 167
What is needed is the establishment of criteria to examine differences in
mediation models. Waldman's categories allow us to compare models based
on their reference to social and legal norms. In the Norm-Generating
category, there are several identifiable models, differentiated by the theory of
conflict each espouses. Here, the Norm-Educating and Norm-Advocating
categories are treated as generic, though greater awareness of this framework
would undoubtedly produce distinct models in those categories as well.
B. Identifying Five Models
In Norm-Generating mediation, parties primarily maintain a closed
system, one which they define and control.168 While all mediation takes
place "in the shadow of the law,"'169 the models used in this category focus
heavily on the parties' values, goals, and future relationships. In the Norm-
Generating category, there are three basic models generally seen as
conflicting with one another1 70: Bargaining/Problem-Solving, Therapy, and
Transformative. Much consideration is due these three models, as they would
be compared within the Norm-Generating category, but the purpose here is
167 Id. at 135-36.
168 See Waldman, The Challenge of Certification, supra note 7, at 733.
The norm-generating model assumes that party autonomy is enhanced when parties
are provided unfettered discretion in the resolution of their dispute .... Attention to
social or legal norms is thought to constrict the parties' consideration of issues and
limit the scope of reviewable options .... [M]ediation practitioners adhering to the
norm-generating model view consideration of social norms to be irrelevant or
destructive of the process.
Id.
169 See Mnookin & Hornhauser, supra note 111, at 950.
170 See Waldman, Identifying Social Norms, supra note 7, at 756.
Both the transformative and problem-solving styles envision a process in which
party settlements derive solely from party norms. The transformative approach seeks
to improve a disputant's moral sensibility through empowerment and cultivation of
empathic response .... The problem-solving approach aims to "find solutions that
meet the needs of all involved parties to the greatest possible degree, and thus
maximize joint satisfaction.".. . Both the problem-solving and transformative
methods fit within the norm-generating paradigm in limiting the scope of inquiry
and discussion to the parties' own articulated norms.
Id. (quoting BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16, at 28, 56).
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merely to establish a framework for comparison. Use of this framework
would prove valuable for future exploration.
While many mediators may in fact be providing information and
encouraging parties to seek out and share information, few examples of
Norm-Educating mediation have been cited as models. One exception is
Black and Joffee's Interdisciplinary Approach, which uses a lawyer-therapist
mediator team to work with parties. 171 Another is Weckstein's definition of
an activist mediator.172
The Norm-Advocating category may correspond most readily to what
lawyer-mediators are doing as evaluative mediation. 173 Mediators using
social and legal norms to define the parameters of agreements may feel
comfortable with identifying this as their model. 174 However, any mediator
171 See Schwebel et al., supra note 39, at 219.
[This] interdisciplinary approach ... assumes that if necessary information is freely
available to parties and exchanged during sessions, then mutually acceptable,
equitable agreements will emerge. Mediators provide parties with information,
guidance, legal assistance, strategies for communicating and for building their
communication skills, and insight into what to expect in the months and years ahead.
Id.
172 See Weckstein, supra note 41, at 546-47.
In an information-based mediation, the receipt of knowledgeable input from the
mediator is a principal reason that the parties choose a subject-matter qualified
mediator. On the other hand, it should be made clear that a suggestion is not a
decision or direction and that the parties are free to reject it.
Id.
173 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 128, at 425.
[S]ome third party neutrals see it as their duty to "correct" misstatements of law or
to expose "false" facts. The authors of the Joint Standards, however, take the
opposite view and suggest that the "mediator should... refrain from providing
professional advice," demonstrating the lack of clarity and consensus in the field.
Id.
174 See Waldman, Identifying Social Norms, supra note 7, at 742.
In some contexts, however, the norm-educating model is insufficiently protective of
party and societal interests. This is true when the power imbalance between the
parties is so extreme that one party cannot provide a trustworthy waiver, when the
institutions administering mediation have a mandate to enforce statutory law, and/or
when the dispute involves public resources or implicates public values in such a
profound way that their enforcement outweighs the disputants' interests in achieving
settlement.
Id.
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using a legal statute to calculate child support is practicing Norm-Advocating
mediation. 175
C. Potential for Comparison of Models
Using these five examples of models, they can be compared regarding
theory of conflict, empowerment of parties, basis of authority, control of
process, and definition of success. 176
1. Norm-Generating.
a. Bargaining/Problem-Solving: conflicts are due to differences in
parties' interests.
b. Therapy: conflicts are due to misunderstanding and failure to
communicate.
c. Transformative: conflict is a crisis in interactions of individuals.
2. Norm-Educating: conflict is due to lack of information about
personal, social and legal norms.
3. Norm-Advocating: conflict is due to lack of adherence to social and
legal norms.
This framework allows mediators to engage in the discourse in an
inclusive way. By looking at the Norm-Generating models, there is a context
to identify real differences between clearly-articulated models, while at the
same time recognizing the similarity in the underlying strategies, which is to
keep the parties focused on their own norms and relationships. In a Norm-
Educating model, parties would also seek all relevant information and
develop negotiation skills. In a Norm-Advocating model, parties must
understand the legal and regulatory restrictions in place that supersede any
agreement. While these categories also include considerable overlap, the
emphasis in each is distinct and the strategies and tools the mediator chooses
will reflect the particular structure. 177
175 Waldman, The Challenge of Certification, supra note 7, at 735.
In [the norm-advocating] model disputant autonomy is merely one value to be
weighed and balanced against competing goals... the mediator relays information
to the parties about relevant social norms, not simply to augment the parties ability
to make informed decisions, but to ensure that their agreement concords with these
norms .... The search for mutually agreeable outcomes takes place within the
framework established by governing social norms.
Id.
176 See Appendix A.
177 See Waldman, Identifying Social Norms, supra note 7, at 765-66.
[E]ach mediation model places a different weight and emphasis on the values of
fairness, disputant autonomy, social justice and self-determination. Predictably, the
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VIII. CAN WE AGREE ON THIS?
A. Elements, Strategies, and Categories
Despite the fact that each of the elements and strategies, are inherently
subjective and difficult to define, can we agree that these elements,
strategies, and categories approximate a definition of mediation vis-A-vis
other ADR processes? While we acknowledge that Waldman's categories
overlap, we can identify the key point of divergence of models as reality
testing. What norms does the mediator choose to reference? What tools and
information are called upon as interventions? What theory of conflict is the
mediator using to assess the status of the mediation? Differentiating between
models becomes necessary, because, in incorporating these elements and
strategies, each model interprets them differently.
B. Practicing What We Preach: Reality Testing About Mediation
Having acknowledged the complicated and amorphous underpinnings of
ADR, we must therefore recognize the valid concerns of critics who believe
that ADR may be reinforcing existing power imbalances, diverting
significant cases from litigation, and suppressing political dissent.1 78 While
serving some individuals, this does not necessarily serve the public good. 179
Alleviating stress on the courts has been given as one of the main selling
points of ADR.180 The result is to regard law and mediation as competing
tensions, both within and among the ethical guidelines, occur at points where the
ethical vectors in the three mediation models begin to diverge. The competing
ethical imperatives of each model create unavoidable strains and inconsistencies.
The most obvious inconsistency in the code lies in the simultaneous
recommendation that mediators promote disputant autonomy while ensuring that
mediated agreements are fair according to societal norms .... Few codes provide
explicit guidance as to how the mediator should assess the fairness of the proposed
mediated agreement.
Id.
178 See Kolb & Rubin, supra note 104, at 244 ("Critics argue that when violence
against women, neighborhood quarrels, and landlord tenant disputes are channeled into
mediation these issues are reduced to individual problems that ignore and depoliticize
their social and economic causes. By individualizing these matters, there is less
possibility for collective action or systemic change.").
179 See Maute, supra note 111, at 369 ("Absent minimal accountability for fairness,
private mediation risks second class justice.").
180 See Carter, supra note 95, at 395 ("[W]e err if we see docket clearing as a
primary goal of any form of ADR. Mediation processes should be designed to improve
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with one another. 181 Although much is said about our overly litigious society,
there are indications that, in fact, the court reforms have resulted in less, not
more, litigation. 182
Critics also argue that while ADR processes are cast as "alternatives" to
appearing in court, they are merely a less visible way for the state to maintain
authority. 183 While appearing benevolent, these processes may in fact mask a
hidden agenda to maintain order. 184 The emphasis on preserving
relationships rather than transforming them can be seen as undermining the
struggle for rights waged by social justice movements. 185 While touting one
advantage of ADR to be the informal and participatory way of dealing with
disputes, this PR campaign may obscure the interest of the state in keeping
the quality of settlements .... Assembly line coercive mediation may be efficient, but it
is not good."); see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 1871.
181 See James E. McGuire & Frank E.A. Sander, Some Questions About "The
Vanishing Trial", Disp. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2004, at 17, 17-18 ("[T]he ADR
community's interest in diverting disputes to its processes must also be recognized,
raising the question of whether it has helped swing the pendulum too far .... [S]hould
the ADR community help identify ways to save for trial those disputes where trials serve
valuable interests?").
182 Id. at 17 ("A new study shows a sharp decline in the number of federal trials
between 1962-2002-from eleven percent to 1.8 percent in civil cases, and from fifteen
percent to less than five percent in criminal cases.").
183 CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT 35 (1985) ("State Authority is not
withdrawing from dispute resolution in periods of informal reform, it is being
transformed .... Forms of therapeutic intervention in conflict resolution often blur the
state's role in organizing these forums for building consensus and in defining what
conflicts they will hear."). Id.
184 Id. at 78.
The Director of the Legal Service Corporation, Thomas Ehrlich... warned that
there "is a danger, which we have seen, that the new forums will become
institutionalized screening mechanisms for moving cases out of the court system
instead of attempts to deliver justice with better results and greater access by the
public ... " Consumer and public interest groups shared this concern: access to
equal justice may conflict with the other two goals of promoting harmony and
maintaining public order.
Id.
185 Id. at 89 ("To introduce labor-management mediation in this area [racial
conflict], Alfred Blumrosen argued, was to undermine the efforts of the civil rights
movement to mobilize legal resources for their political battles and erode the legal
protections against racial discrimination and the remedies for those discriminated
against.").
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important issues out of the courts. 186 ADR professionals would do well to
recognize the valid concerns of those who question the assumption that it is
always preferable to avoid litigation.
IX. CONCLUSION
As we engage in the ongoing dialogue about mediation models within
the profession, 187 we continue to explain the process to consumers and
gatekeepers. 188 The first decision the consumer must make is an informed
choice about whether or not to participate. This is a key moment of self-
determination and should reflect participants' consideration of all necessary
information, as an act of conscious intent. Mediators need to explain in a
clear and efficient way, the boundaries of the processes they offer, to support
parties' self-determination and mediator credibility. We must say what we
do, and do what we say. 189 In addition to undermining self-determination,
blurring processes diminishes the efforts to be recognized as a profession. 190
186 ld. at 170 ("Informalism expands the capacity of the justice system to manage
minor complaints and legitimates the extension of state intervention on functionalist
grounds .... The new basis for legitimacy, functionalism, places a special emphasis on
the role of participation in conflict management.").
187 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 1896-97 ("[I]t makes little sense to talk
about ADR as if it was a reified unitary form. ADR consists of a wide variety of
processes--each with increasing diversity in its variations-that merits discussion,
examination and evaluation.").
188 Id. at 1918-19.
[A] growing number of states have required, either by formal rule or by ethics
opinion, that lawyers inform their clients about different forms of dispute resolution,
either when they are suggested by the other party, or as an independent obligation.
Thus, lawyers will increasingly have to understand and embrace ADR enough to
inform clients concerning the advantages such processes offer over more
conventional forms of litigated solutions to problems.
Id.
189 See Della Noce, supra note 16, at 557.
[T]he field will have the opportunity-if not the obligation-to do what has not
been attempted in any concerted way since the inception of court-connected
mediation: to create (or re-create) court-connected mediation programs in explicitly
theory-driven ways .... The chosen theoretical framework will guide the selection
and qualification of third parties, the practices that are deemed competent and
incompetent, and the policies that will promote effective use of the program and
effective evaluation.
Id.
190 See Philip J. Harter, Federal Dispute Resolution Coming of Age, DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Winter 2004, at 26. Harter reviews JEFFREY M. SENGER, FEDERAL DIsPUTE
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Clarity about models would make it possible to uphold a set of ethical
standards and practices the consumer can identify. Such clarity would also
provide a basis for assessing the training and evaluation of mediators.
Riskin has presented us with a new set of grids to bring home the point
that the mediator has influence. 191 Even if we agree that this influence
ultimately rests on the consent of the parties, 192 without acknowledging this
influence, mediators carry a hidden agenda. 193 Mediators cannot avoid
bringing their experience, education and personal perspectives into the
process. 194 Impartiality 195 between the parties and neutrality regarding the
RESOLUTION: USING ADR WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (2004). Harter raises
the issue of professionalism regarding Senger's suggestion that the government, to keep
down costs may want to ask the mediator to reduce her or his fee. In addition, mediators
are now trained in every government agency and these "in-house neutrals" are seen as
coming for free. However, Harter points out the taxpayer is paying them about $100 an
hour which is the same approximate cost for an outside professional. Harter also raises
the question of the relationship between the mediator and the agency hiring them. He
maintains that if the mediator is seen as a contractor, the agency doing the hiring has
control over them. Harter's answer to this problem is that mediators must be treated as
professionals. But, this begs the question of whether we, as professionals, can be neutral
in such circumstances?
191 See Riskin, supra note 5, at 38-46.
192 See MOORE, supra note 37, at 17.
The mediator's authority, such as it is, resides in his or her ability to appeal to the
parties to reach an agreement based on their own interests or the past performance or
reputation as a useful resource. Authority, or recognition of a right to influence the
outcome of the dispute, is granted by the parties themselves rather than by an
external law, contract or agency.
Id.
193 See Grillo, supra note 109, at 1584-85.
Mediators.. . exert a great deal of power .... The mediator also can set the rules
regarding who talks, when they may speak, and what may be said. The power of the
mediator is not always openly acknowledged but is hidden beneath protestations that
the process belongs to the parties. This can make the parties feel less, not more, in
control of the process and its consequences for their lives. There is much room for,
but little acknowledgment of, the possibility of the mediator's exhibiting partiality or
imposing a hidden agenda on the parties.
Id.
194 Peter Reason & Hilary Bradbury, Introduction: Inquiry and Participation in
Search of a World Worthy of Human Aspiration, in HANDBOOK OF ACTION RESEARCH:
PARTICIPATIVE INQUIRY AND PRACTICE 7 (Peter Reason & Hilary Bradbury eds, 2001).
Many writers and commentators are suggesting that the modernist world view or
paradigm of Western civilization is reaching the end of its useful life. It is suggested
that there is a fundamental shift occurring in our understanding of the universe and
our place in it, that new patterns of thought and belief are emerging that will
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outcome are only two forms of bias. The sum total of the life experience of
the mediator, the subjective self, enters into each mediation and impacts the
process and the outcome. 196 To deny this is to obscure the role and value of
the third party.
A clear explanation of the model being used based on the norms being
referenced supports self-determination of the parties. Transparency 197
regarding the model, information, strategies, and tools used can allow the
mediator to influence participants and, at the same time, continue to support
self-determination. Comparison of mediation models using Waldman's
categories, and analysis of strategies used within those models, would also
contribute to the ability of mediators to understand and convey the processes
transform our experience, our thinking and our action... Research in the West has
been integral with a positivist world view, a view that sees science as separate from
everyday life and the researcher as subject within a world of separate
objects.... This is part of a modem world view based on the metaphor of linear
progress, absolute truth and rational planning (Harvey, 1990). Seeking objective
truth, the modem world view makes no connection between knowledge and power.
Id.
195 See Grillo, supra note 109, at 1587.
[I]n a very fundamental way, impartiality is a myth. It cannot exist in anything
approaching a pure form, although we would like it to, and often we pretend that it
does. The concept of impartiality is based on the notion of an observer without a
perspective. But any observer inevitably sees from a particular perspective, whether
that perspective is acknowledged or not. Mediators, like all other human beings,
have biases, values, and points of view .... The proper role of these attitudes in
mediation is and should be a subject of debate: should a mediator try to keep her
own attitudes out of the mediation entirely, or should those attitudes be disclosed?
When does disclosure become intrusive; that is, when is it something done to protect
the mediator rather than to benefit the parties?
Id.
196 See Kolb & Rubin, supra note 104, at 240. The authors indicate that there are
lessons to be learned from international relations scholars, who have argued that
in international relations at least, it is neither possible or necessary for third parties
to be unbiased .... In the interdependent community of nations there is simply no
place to retreat. Each nation is dependent, in one way or another, on every other
nation; hence, each has an interest in particular outcomes and can never claim to be
truly unbiased.
Id.
197 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 1897 ("At this early stage of development,
full disclosure may be all that we can achieve, leaving it to the concrete cases, market
forces, and common law system to explore the full legal and economic ramifications of
different kinds of processes.").
820
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they use. 198 This would reduce the danger of process abuses 199 and further
the discourse on defining training200 and best practices. 20 1
198 Common Ground Negotiation Services, Charlottesville, VA offers a Continuing
Mediation Education workshop entitled "Mediation Models: A Professional
Conundrum," which presents five models. Participants form five role play groups, one for
each model. Role players are asked to write an introduction based on their model and to
role play that model. The five role plays are compared during the feedback session. In the
group discussion, we are asking, "Have the different models produced different
outcomes?" This is, of course, anecdotal, and hardly conclusive evidence of what would
occur in a real mediation. The exercise is valuable, however, for mediators to look at
what we do under a microscope of sorts. The goal is to examine the outcomes based on
what we said we were doing. See Common Ground Negotiation Service, at
http://www.conunongroundnegotiations.com/workshops.html (last visited Mar. 18,
2005).
199 See Grillo, supra note 109, at 1550.
Voluntary mediation should not be abandoned, but should be recognized as a
powerful process which should be used carefully and thoughtfully. Entering into
such a process with one who has known you intimately and who now seems to
threaten your whole life and being has great creative, but also enormous destructive,
power.
Id.
200 See Love & Kovach, supra note 30, at 299 ("As tests for mediator competence
are developed, objective criteria and clear lines between processes are necessary to
conclude what a passing grade or correct answer entails. An eclectic and amorphous
process does not lend itself to the targeted learning objectives that effective teaching,
training and service delivery require.").
201 Lela Porter Love, Twenty-Five Years Later with Promises To Keep: Legal
Education in Dispute Resolution and Training of Mediators, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 597,606 (2002).
We need more research, though we have made a good start, to develop useful
theory... to address concerns raised by the impact of gender, culture or disability
on participation in mediation. We need to know more about the dynamics of
power ... and the environments necessary to spark and support creativity .... We
need to tie theory to practice by developing vivid, targeted training material.
Id.
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